Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 5

1928

Dependent Relative Revocation
Alvin E. Evans
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Evans, Alvin E. (1928) "Dependent Relative Revocation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 16: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol16/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

NOTES
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
In the November number of the Kentucky Law Journal'
is an interesting discussion by a note writer on the subject of
dependent relative revocation in Kentucky. He observes inter
alia that the general doctrine is applied in its entirety in something more than half of the states, is accepted by
other states with limitations, and is not referred to at all in
Kentucky. He observes, however, that there are certain cases
-which seem to raise the question whether or not the doctrine is
recognized in the state, and he discusses interestingly several of
them, among which is Wells v. Wells.2 In this case he finds that
the testator had the name of one of the executors stricken from
the will and the name of another inserted, but there was no
formal execution of the will thereafter. The will was admitted
to probate. He says that there were three alternatives
possible with reference to the determination of the question, who
is the executor. First, the original will might be probated without change; second, that there was a partial revocation, and
third that the substituted executor might act in place of the one
formerly named. He also finds that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is based essentially upon mistake.
He does not refer to an article on the same subject written by
Professor Joseph Warren and published in the Harvard Law
Review3 which, to the mind of the present writer, almost completely revolutionizes our attitude towards the subject and
shows how the courts have misunderstood what they were in
fact doing.
Professor Warren points out that there are two concepts
constantly confused. One is that of a conditional revocation in
which the testator does some act of a revocatory nature, but is
all the time in a conditional frame of mind, so to speak. He
says in substance to himself, "This act which I am doing, in
form an act of revocation, is not at the present time intended
as a revocation, but it is preliminary and will be a revocation as
soon as I have done some further act." It seems quite evident
that this type of case is exceedingly rare.
116 Ky. L. Jour. 54
2 4 T. B. Mon. 152 (Ky.)
" 33 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1920).
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Mr. Warren finds the second type of case to be based on
mistake. The testator does in fact an act of revocation and intends it to be a revocation, but the presupposition under which
the act was performed fails. In such case, however, there is
very clearly a revocation, and he shows that when the courts
have called it a conditional or dependent relative revocation
they have deceived themselves, and what they have actually
done where the will was probated, was to set aside the revocation
and restore the will. It is altogether probable that the courts
have not realized that that is precisely what they are doing.
Assuming however, that a revocation has been made under a
mistaken presupposition, what shall we do? It seems evident
that if the testator could now be asked whether he desired his
original will to stand and if he would reply that he did wish it
to stand, that the revocation should be set aside and the will
restored. If, however, he would desire the will to be revoked in
case he cannot have the dispositions which he really desired,
then the revocation should not be set aside and the original will
should not be restored to efficacy.
How shall we determine whether or not he would desire to
have the original will stand or not stand, under the circumstances? If the will which is insufficiently executed be substantially like the will which was revoked, it is fair to say that there
are equitable grounds for setting. the revocation aside. It would
also seem that if there have been substantial changes with respect to the beneficiaaries then there are no equitable grounds
for setting the revocation aside. Under this view, it would
seem that the court in Powell v. Powell4 reached a wrong conclusion. There the testator in the original will gave his property to his grandson. In a later will he gave the property to his
nephew. The later will was destroyed under a mistaken belief
that the destruction of it would revive the former will. The
court held that the destroyed will should stand and that it was
not revoked. What actually happened. was that the second Will
which was revoked by destruction, was restored, in direct conflict with the desire of the testator who, it appears, had fallen
out with the nephew and desired the property to go to his
grandson. If the revocation of the second will had not been set
aside and he had been held to have died intestate, his desires
'L. R. 1 P.&.

209 (1866)
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would have been much more nearly carried out, for the grandson would have taken as an -heir.
It is not clear quite how the writer of the note reaches the
conclusion that the general doctrine is applied in its entirety in
more than half the states, nor how he finds that it is applied with
limitations in other states. The present writer supposes that it
is a part of the general technique of all common-law jurisdictions.
The present writer would suppose in the Wells v. Wells
case that here it is pretty clearly a case of revocation and the
revocation should be set aside on equitable grounds and that
therefore the original will should stand without change. He
does not see how the doctrine of partial revocation can in any
way be applicable to this case; that is to say, if there was in fact
a revocation. Of course, if there was no revocation at all
except as to one of the executors, then there is no problem of
dependent relative revocation.
The case of Sanders v. Babbitt5 seems to be clearly a case of
revocation without equitable grounds for setting the revocation
-aside. It is true there is a failure in the presupposition under
-which the revocation took place, but the case is unlike Onions v.
Tyrer6 where the subsequent instrument which failed was substantially the same as the revoked instrument. It seems
hardly fair to say that the Kentucky court refuses to apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. What the court
held was in substance that there was a revocation and that there
was no ground for setting it aside.
The importance of Professor Warren's article in clearing
up the problem here involved can scarcely be over-estimated.
The writer of the note has shown the former view of the courts
and the lack of any definition of this subject or rationale of the
doctrine. We wish he had discussed the problem also in the
light of Air. Warren's article.
ALVIN E. EVANS

5 106 Ky. 646 (1893)
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